Can the big post-war institutions that structure globalization really adapt to an era of permanent crisis and fractured multipolarity? Or are we watching the slow erosion of a system that no one quite dares to replace?
For companies, investors and policymakers, this is not an abstract debate. It shapes supply chains, regulation, capital flows, and even the predictability of the rulebook they rely on to do business across borders.
From post-war order to permanent crisis mode
The current global architecture was largely designed for a different world. The UN, Bretton Woods institutions (IMF, World Bank), the WTO and a myriad of specialized agencies were built on three assumptions:
- Western economic and political dominance
- Relatively stable blocs and clear alliances
- Crisis as an exception, not a permanent state
None of these assumptions fully holds today. Instead, three features define the current context:
- Permanent crisis: financial shocks, pandemics, climate emergencies, cyber attacks, energy crunches, and now major wars with global spillovers.
- Fractured multipolarity: no single hegemon, but several competing power centers (US, China, EU, India, regional coalitions, “middle powers”).
- Interdependence plus weaponization: trade, tech and finance tightly intertwined, yet increasingly used as tools of pressure (sanctions, export controls, data localization).
International institutions were not designed for this level of systemic, overlapping disruption. But saying they are “obsolete” is misleading. In practice, they are already mutating, often de facto rather than through grand institutional redesign.
Stress-testing the institutions: where they failed, where they still matter
Look at the last 15 years as a chain of stress tests.
2008 financial crisis: The IMF, G20 and central bank network did prevent a total collapse. The architecture bent but did not break. But reforms of global financial governance remained partial and asymmetric.
COVID-19: The WHO came under fire, vaccine nationalism trumped global solidarity, and supply chains were disrupted on a scale unseen in decades. COVAX was an imperfect—but not negligible—response: by mid-2022 it had shipped over 1.7 billion doses, far from needs but well above zero.
Climate emergency: The UNFCCC process delivers incremental progress (Paris Agreement, COPs), but emissions continue to rise overall. Climate finance targets are repeatedly missed, and implementation relies heavily on national policies and private capital, not just multilateral pledges.
Trade fragmentation: The WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism has been paralyzed since the US blocked Appellate Body appointments. Yet the WTO still provides the backbone of global trade rules: more than 98% of world trade occurs under its disciplines, even as states bypass it via regional deals.
The pattern is clear: institutions are rarely decisive “problem solvers” on their own, but they remain indispensable as:
- Rulebooks that constrain worst-case unilateral behavior
- Forums for negotiation, standard-setting and signaling
- Data providers and technical assistance hubs
- Financiers of last resort for some countries and sectors
The real question is not whether they survive, but in what form and with which degree of relevance in a world where power is more diffuse and consensus harder to reach.
Fractured multipolarity: who wants what from the system?
To understand where reform is possible, we need to map the interests on the table.
United States: Still the central node of the dollar system, the main security provider for many allies, and a key veto player in institutions like the IMF and World Bank. Washington oscillates between defending the existing order and bypassing it when it feels constrained (trade disputes via tariffs instead of WTO, climate via “clubs” and domestic industrial policy).
China: Seeks more influence in existing bodies (greater IMF quota share, more say at the UN), while building parallel structures (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Belt and Road, BRICS expansion). Beijing presents this as “rebalancing” an unfair system, while avoiding any architecture that would constrain its own room for maneuver too strongly.
European Union: One of the main beneficiaries of rule-based multilateralism, the EU has a strong interest in preserving and updating global institutions. But internal divisions and limited hard power constrain its leverage.
Global South and “middle powers” (India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, Gulf states, etc.): They want more representation, more financing on better terms, and less perceived double standard in the application of norms (on sanctions, climate responsibility, debt, etc.). Many of them hedge between blocs.
In this configuration, full-scale redesign of institutions is politically unrealistic. What we are seeing instead is a layered, more complex governance system:
- Universal institutions (UN, IMF, WTO) remaining as “default” platforms
- Regional and thematic coalitions gaining weight (African Union, ASEAN, GCC, climate alliances, digital partnerships)
- Ad hoc clubs and minilateral formats (G7, G20, Quad, IPEF, climate clubs, supply chain alliances)
This fragmentation can look like dysfunction. It is also, in practice, how adaptation happens when consensus at 193 countries is impossible.
How institutions are already adapting — quietly
Beyond the headlines about blockages, a series of incremental but significant shifts are underway.
1. From universal rules to variable geometry
The WTO is the clearest example. With the classic “single undertaking” (everyone agrees on everything) stuck for years, members are turning to:
- Plurilateral agreements on specific topics (e-commerce, services domestic regulation, investment facilitation) involving only willing countries.
- Regional trade agreements that go far beyond WTO rules (CPTPP in Asia-Pacific, African Continental Free Trade Area, EU’s network of deals).
Formally, the WTO remains the umbrella. In reality, much of the innovation in trade rules now happens elsewhere, then occasionally feeds back into the multilateral system.
2. Rebalancing voice and vote
IMF quota reforms, World Bank shareholding adjustments, expansion of the UN Security Council’s agenda to include climate and cyber issues, G20’s inclusion of the African Union as a permanent member in 2023: none of these changes are revolutionary, but together they reflect a shift of legitimacy and attention towards emerging powers and regional actors.
For multilateral development banks, governance tweaks are often tied to capital increases and new mandates, giving rising powers more say in exchange for fresh resources and cooperation on priorities such as climate or digitalization.
3. Broadening mandates to match systemic risks
Institutions originally created for narrow, sectoral tasks are now expected to deal with cross-cutting crises:
- The IMF integrates climate-related financial risks into surveillance and lending frameworks.
- The World Bank is under pressure to become a “climate bank for the world”, leveraging its balance sheet more aggressively.
- The WHO negotiates a pandemic accord to improve preparedness, data-sharing and response mechanisms.
- Standard-setters like the Financial Stability Board and IOSCO move into climate disclosures, crypto-assets, and operational resilience.
This expansion of scope raises coordination issues but also reflects a realistic view: in a permanent crisis environment, narrow mandates can be a recipe for irrelevance.
4. Leveraging data and technology
From real-time trade data to satellite-based climate monitoring, institutions that manage to harness technology can increase their value added without new treaties. The IMF’s use of big data for capital flow monitoring, the WTO’s data portals on trade measures, or global health surveillance systems are all examples of this “soft modernization”.
A realistic reform agenda: what can actually change in a fractured world?
Ambitious proposals for a “new Bretton Woods” or a total UN reboot make for compelling speeches, but they collide with hard power realities. More realistic is to think in terms of four pragmatic directions.
1. Incremental but meaningful governance shifts
We can expect continued pressure for:
- Greater representation of Africa, South Asia and Latin America in key bodies.
- Progressive adjustments of IMF and World Bank quotas and voting power.
- More systematic inclusion of regional organizations (AU, ASEAN, EU, CELAC, GCC) in global decision-making formats.
These steps will not eliminate geopolitical rivalry, but they reduce the perception that the system is locked in a 1990s snapshot of power balances.
2. “Coalitions of the willing” anchored in multilateral frameworks
On climate, digital governance, health, and even trade, we are likely to see more:
- Issue-specific clubs (climate clubs focused on carbon pricing and border adjustments, cybersecurity alliances, trusted data-sharing frameworks).
- Interoperable standards rather than fully global rules (for AI regulation, ESG disclosures, digital trade).
The key question is whether these clubs remain compatible with the broader multilateral system (open to accession, transparent, non-discriminatory beyond justified standards), or become tools of bloc competition. Institutions such as the OECD, WTO or standard-setting bodies can play a bridging role here.
3. Hardening the financial safety net
Permanent crisis implies more frequent shocks to vulnerable economies. The last decade has already seen:
- New precautionary IMF instruments.
- Expansion of regional financial arrangements (European Stability Mechanism, Chiang Mai Initiative in Asia, BRICS’ New Development Bank).
- Increased use of swap lines between central banks.
The likely next step is better coordination between these layers, plus more predictable mechanisms for debt restructuring, as many low and middle-income countries face unsustainable burdens exacerbated by higher interest rates and climate shocks. The Paris Club and newer creditors (notably China) will have to find more stable modalities of cooperation.
4. Mandates aligned with systemic transitions
Three transitions cut across all crises:
- Decarbonization of the global economy
- Digitalization and AI adoption
- Demographic shifts and human capital challenges
Institutions that explicitly align their mandates, tools and metrics with these transitions—rather than treating them as side issues—will remain central. That implies, for example:
- Development banks mainstreaming climate and digital infrastructure in every project.
- Trade and competition authorities coordinating on platform regulation and data flows.
- Standard-setters factoring in AI, cybersecurity and systemic operational risk.
What this means for businesses and decision-makers
For companies, investors and public authorities, a more fragmented and crisis-prone global order does not mean “no rules”. It means more layers of rules, more variability by geography, and faster change.
Three practical implications stand out.
1. Regulatory intelligence becomes a strategic asset
The interplay between global norms (WTO, OECD, Basel, ISSB, WHO) and regional or national regulations (EU’s Green Deal, US export controls, China’s data rules, African Continental Free Trade Area protocols) is increasingly complex. Firms that systematically track:
- How standards are set (which forums matter for their sector?)
- Where new coalitions or clubs may create first-mover advantages or barriers
- Which jurisdictions export their regulatory frameworks (EU with GDPR and AI Act, for example)
will be in a better position to anticipate rather than merely react.
2. Scenario planning must integrate geopolitical and institutional variables
Traditional macro scenarios focusing on growth and inflation are no longer sufficient. Boards and executive teams need to ask:
- What if sanctions, export controls or investment screening expand to my sector?
- How would a regional conflict or a pandemic resurgence interact with institutional responses (e.g. emergency trade restrictions, coordinated monetary policies)?
- Which international forums are likely to shape the future rules of my industry (AI ethics, cross-border data, green finance, supply chain security)?
Institutional behavior—who coordinates with whom, under what rules—becomes a key input for risk management.
3. Public–private collaboration is no longer optional
As governments and institutions struggle to govern fast-moving technologies and cross-border risks, they increasingly rely on the private sector for expertise, data, and implementation capacity. For businesses, this opens both obligations and opportunities:
- Participating in standard-setting initiatives and consultation processes.
- Co-developing crisis response tools (health data platforms, cyber incident sharing, green finance taxonomies).
- Aligning internal risk frameworks with emerging international norms to ease future compliance.
In other words, “multilateralism” is no longer only about states. Large firms, industry bodies and civil society organizations are now de facto part of the governance ecosystem.
A moving target, not a static answer
Can international institutions adapt to an era of permanent crisis in a fractured multipolar world? So far, they are doing what political systems usually do under stress: muddling through—sometimes too slowly, sometimes in unexpected directions, but rarely standing completely still.
For all their flaws, these institutions still provide:
- A baseline of rules that most actors accept most of the time.
- Platforms where rival powers can still talk instead of act unilaterally.
- Mechanisms—imperfect but real—for managing debt, trade disputes, health emergencies and financial shocks.
The more realistic lens is not to ask whether they will “succeed” or “fail”, but how their partial adaptation will shape the environment in which companies invest, innovate and operate. Power is more dispersed, crises are more frequent, but the need for some shared rules and common references has never been greater.
For business leaders and policymakers, the key is to engage with this evolving architecture proactively rather than nostalgically. The post-war order is not coming back. The next one will not be designed in a single conference hall. It is emerging, step by step, in ministerial corridors, technical committees, regional summits and public–private labs—precisely where those who understand its stakes can still help to shape it.
